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§ 304 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1954:
REDEMPTIONS BY RELATED CORPORATIONS
THOMAS D. TERRY

I.
Introduction
The primary object of this study is an analysis of § 304 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which deals with a specific
device designed to insure that certain transactions which are
entered into by a taxpayer with a corporation produce tax consequences which depend upon the substance of the transaction
rather than mere form. Specifically, § 304 is concerned with
sales of stock of a controlled corporation by a shareholder to
another corporation which he also controls and the sale of the
stock of a parent corporation to its controlled subsidiary.
Before the detailed provisions of § 304 are examined, a more
general topic is treated for the purpose of developing background on the reason for creating multiple corporations, and
briefly indicating what factors may influence the choice of one
form of multiple corporate alignment over another. Since § 304
applies different rules in the case of parent subsidiary corporations as compared with corporations which are not related
through intercorporate stockholdings but which are controlled
by the same taxpayers, it is relevant to examine the reasons why
one form is selected over another.
II.
Multiple CorporationAlignment-Brother-Sisteror Parent
Subsidiary?
There are various circumstances which may suggest the
utilization of brother-sister corporations 1 as a means of sepa1 The Internal Revenue Code does not use the term "brother-sister corpora-

tion." In § 304(a) (1), the expression ". . . related corporation (other
than subsidiary)" is used to describe the situation where "one or more
persons are in control of each of two corporations." The Committee Reports on the 1954 Code with regard to § 304 do refer to the corporation
under common control as "brother-sister corporations," however. See S.
Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
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rating the total business activities of a single individual or
group of individuals acting together. These circumstances may
arise when an entrepreneur who is in control of an established
corporation desires to enter into a new business venture or
when the controlling interest of an established corporation
desire to divide the corporation into two or more legal entities.
Generally, the reasons for separating the investment into two
or more corporations are based upon the distinct advantages
which arise when two or more legal entities are utilized rather
than a mere branch of an existing corporation. For example, the
following considerations favor the multiple corporation structure over a branch operation:
(1) A separate corporation is more likely to acquire a "local
personality" than a branch of an existing corporation geographically located elsewhere. In addition to the more intangible effects which this situation produces, there are some very
tangible immediate benefits, e.g., the foreign corporation is not
"present" in the jurisdiction where the newly created corporation is now operating (assuming there is no other substantial
relationship between the foreign corporation and the jurisdiction) and hence not subject to regulatory or tax requirements of that jurisdiction.
(2) The two corporations are entitled to their own $25,000
surtax exemption and $100,000 accumulated earnings credit
under § 11 and § 531 of the Internal Revenue Code.2
(3) Hazardous enterprises may be carried on by separate
corporations without subjecting the investment in one corporation to the risks of the other. 3
It will be observed that these examples are illustrative of the
type of advantages which accrue to multi-corporate investment
regardless of whether the separate legal entities are directly
related in a parent-subsidiary pattern or whether they are con2 Assuming that the creation and subsequent inter-corporate relationship does
not invoke § 269, § 482 or § 1551, which deny the advantages here
referred to, under specified circumstances.
3 This, too, is subject to an exception in extreme circumstances. See Taylor v.
Standard Gas & Electric Company, 59 Sup. Ct. 543 (1939) ["The Deep
Rock Doctrine"].
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trolled by the same interests and thus take on a brother-sister
relationship. 4 There are tax factors, however, which may make
the selection of a brother-sister arrangement the wiser of the
two possibilities, however:
(1) If the new enterprise is expected to have a limited life
and immediate prospects of earnings, the stockholders will be
able to completely liquidate the new corporation under §
331(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code at capital gain rates
(assuming the corporation is not collapsible within the meaning of § 341). Hence, the brother-sister arrangement would
permit recoupment of the assets devoted to the new undertaking
with a minimum of tax trouble. On the other hand in order for
the beneficial owners (stockholders of the parent corporation) to
recapture the assets of a subsidiary which is once-removed from
the controlling shareholder by virtue of the intervening parent
corporation, it will be necessary to travel the more cumbersome
and uncertain route of § 355 division s followed by a liquidation
of the original subsidiary corporation. This is by far the most
cogent reason for considering the brother-sister type of organization when a new investment is contemplated.'
(2) If the existing corporation is closely held and its gross
income is of the nature described in § 542(a)(1) and thereby is
subject to the special tax imposed on "personal holding com4

It should be noted here that brother-sister corporations and parent-sub-

sidiary corporations may be subjected to different "tests" in order to

determine whether they have achieved the necessary independence to
qualify for the three advantages listed in the text, but once that hurdle
is cleared, the results are the same. See, for example, the discussion of
McCowan, Brother-Sister Corporations: Some Operational Problems, 16
N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Taxation 305 (1958) to the effect that the power
given to the Commissioner under § 482 to allocate income and deductions
among taxpayers should have no application as between brother-sister
corporations but should apply to parent-subsidiary relationships. On the
other hand, the test of "ordinary and necessary" under § 61 should be
applied to brother-sister intercorporate dealings.
5 The requirements of § 355 may be bothersome in such a situation, e.g.,
355(a) (1) (A) (ii) requiring the parent (distributing) corporation to
own at least 80% of the voting stock and 80% of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock; 355 (b) (2) (B) requiring the active
conduct of a trade or business by the subsidiary (acquired) corporation
for the 5 year period ending on the date of distribution.
6 See Kahn, Parent-SubsidiaryCorporation, 16 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Taxation
(1958) 315, 337 ff;Driscoll, Incorporating in Multi-Corporate Form,
an Existing Business, Id. at 260.
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panies," it will be necessary to avoid the parent-subsidiary relationship and, thus, the brother-sister situation is indicated. 7
(3) Under the provisions of Subchapter S of the 1954
Code, " a domestic corporation which does not have more than
10 shareholders (all of whom must be either individuals or estates)
may be entitled to elect not to be taxed as a corporation. If it is
desired to take advantage of this election with regard to the new
corporation to be created by the investors, a parent-subsidiary
arrangement would frustrate their plan.
In addition to the above considerations which are of importance when the new investment opportunity is first recognized, brother and sister corporations are often created as the
result of the division of a single corporation into two or more
corporations. This may be desirable or required for any of the
following general business reasons:
(1)A division of an existing corporation may be required
to comply with an anti-trust decree.
(2) A state law requiring that a corporation doing a local
business be required to have a certain percentage of local
stockholders.

(3) To separate a regulated enterprise from an unregulated
one.
Assuming that for these or other reasons the stockholders of
a single corporation decide to divide their investment into two
or more corporations, they may either create subsidiary corporations (which will, no doubt, qualify for non-recognition
of gain or loss under § 351) or they may employ a type "D"
corporate reorganization under § 368(a)(1) (D) and thus be
required to qualify the transaction under § 355. The normal
7 There are special rules applicable, however, when the "personal holding

company" parent files a consolidated return with its subsidiary.
§ 542 (b).
7a

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1371-1377.

See
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operation' of a § 355 tax free division will produce brothersister corporations. In so far as tax planning is concerned,
there are generally different factors bearing on the choice of
brother-sister versus parent-subsidiary corporations when a
portion of the assets of a controlled corporation are to be used
to supply the capital for the new corporation than when the
corporations were to be independently created. This is primarily due to the fact that the division of a single corporation,
although legally feasible, will probably require "direct communication" between the two new entities for some period of time.
These "communications" may entail inter-corporate transfer of
assets, after the corporations have attained a separate legal
status, and it is not unlikely that any future expansion of the
newly created corporation will require the financial assistance of
the original controlled corporation. On its face it would certainly not seem to be an unreasonable hypothesis that when a
single corporation is divided into two or more corporations
there is more likelihood of an interdependence between the old
and the new than would be the case if the two corporations were
independently created. It is at this point that the advantages of
the parent-subsidiary form seem to outweigh the brothersister possibility most distinctly:
(1) In the case of brother-sister corporations, assets would
have to be transferred at "arms length" prices or the stockholders would have to secure the assets from one of the corporations and transfer them, in their individual capacities, to
the other entity. Such maneuvers are subject to close administrative and judicial scrutiny, with possible dividend consequences of considerable amounts to the stockholder. Communication between parent and subsidiary is not subject to
these same "disguised dividend" risks because the parent may
directly contribute to the capital of its subsidiary and, in the
other direction, dividends declared by the subsidiary to the
8 It is possible under the 1954 Code to divide an existing corporation
into two or more corporations under § 355 without the necessity of a
pro-rata distribution of the stock of the controlled corporation to the
stockholders of the distributing corporation (§ 355 (a) (2)). Thus, a
§ 355 division will not always result in the creation of brother-sister
corporations. The effect of a non-pro-rata distribution as a result of a
"split up" or "split-off" was uncertain under § 112(g) (1) (0) of the
1939 Code. See BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (1959) 343.
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parent will qualify under § 243 for the 85% dividends received
deduction.
(2) Assuming the requirements of §§ 1501, 1504 are met, a
parent may enjoy the advantages of consolidating its income
with the subsidiary. In the case of substantial anticipated losses
in the formative years of the new corporation's existence, this
advantage may outweigh all others. 9
(3) If, for any reason, the two corporations anticipate a
return to their old status of a single corporation in the future, a
parent-subsidiary relationship will offer the possibility of a
liquidation of the subsidiary into the parent, with tax advantages. Under § 381, the parent will inherit most of the favorable
tax attributes of the subsidiary. 1o
Other advantages of the parent-subsidiary relationship
which are not directly related to the "communication" problem, discussed above, include:
(1) The tax benefits available to employees and, thus, the
ability of a corporation to compete for managerial talent may
be materially aided by the implementation of a stock option
plan under § 421. For purposes of § 421, if a parent-subsidiary
relationship exists between two corporations (a 50% ownership
test applies), one corporation may grant an option to its employees or the employees of its parent or subsidiary. The
option so granted may be in the stock of the granting corporation, its parent, or its subsidiaries. The applicable Code provisions require an "unbroken chain of ownership" between
the corporations. Therefore, related corporations would not be
entitled to this very desirable flexibility.
(2) For estate planning purposes, § 303 permitting the
redemption of stock of a corporation to qualify for exchange
9 It should be noted here that if the new corporation is formed as the

"brother" of a pre-existing corporation, it may still be possible to take
advantage of early losses of the new corporation by qualifying the new
corporation under Subchapter S, §§ 1371-1377, and by virtue of § 1374,
"passing through" the loss to the shareholders. Of course, this plan is
beneficial only to the extent that shareholders have income in their individual capacities while a consolidated return will serve to offset profits
of the affiliated corporations, directly.
10 Section 381 is, by its terms, specifically inapplicable to a Kimbell-Diamond
liquidation of the subsidiary under § 334(b) (2).
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treatment without compliance with the conditions of § 302(b),
is often a most important factor. Section 303(b)(2)(B) provides
a special rule to the effect that if the decedent owns 75% or more
of the stock of two or more corporations, such holdings shall be
treated as the stock of a single corporation for purposes of
meeting the percentage requirements of § 303(b)(2)(A). This
rule places a tax premium on a multiple corporate arrangement
in which the decedent concentrates his interests in a single
corporation. If he creates related "brother-sister" corporations
and he does not own at least 75% of each of these entities, he
will have difficulty in meeting the percentage requirements of
§ 303(b)(2)(A). He may still obtain the advantages of separate
corporations by the use of a parent-subsidiary group, however,
and increase his estates' chances of qualifying for a § 303
redemption.
By way of summary, there would not appear to be a great
variety of circumstances which suggest the use of brothersister corporations when a parent subsidiary alignment is also a
possibility. In the great majority of business situations, about
the most that can be said is that, given certain conditions,
brother-sister corporations may do the job "just as well." One
restricted situation does bear emphasis, however, and that is the
case of a corporation which is capable of independent existence
from the standpoint of immediate capital needs and funds for
future expansion and for which the creators contemplate a
rather limited life. Here, the use of brother-sister corporations
will minimize the inherent tax risks of all multiple corporate
plans and permit the liquidation of the corporations with a
minimum of complication.
III.
The Legislative andJudicialHistory of § 304 of the 1954 Code
Section 304 of the 1954 Code is a legislative solution to a
particular phase of the never-ending quest of stockholders to
take down the earnings and profits of their closely-held corporations without the realization of ordinary income and without
releasing their interest in the corroration's affairs. Since the
Supreme Court decided Eisnerv. Mafcomber" in 1920, Congress
1140 Sup. Ct. 189 (1920).
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has recognized that the redemption by a corporation of its own
stock could be used for purposes of avoiding ordinary income
tax consequences although the substance of the transaction
was no different from the receipt of a dividend taxable at
ordinary income rates. Therefore, the legislative history of
§ 304 has its genesis in the rules which were originally developed to combat this practice.
After Eisner v. Macomber, Congress moved swiftly to prevent the tax free receipt of a stock dividend and the subsequent
redemption of the shares at capital gains rates. 12 By the time
the 1939 Code was enacted, it was clear that the declaration of a
stock dividend was not an essential step in a plan by stockholders to avoid the results of a §301 distribution. Any
redemption of stock by a corporation which was "essentially
equivalent to a dividend" was detrimental to the general
pattern of the tax law on corporate distributions and, therefore,
§ 155(g) of the 1939 Code was not restricted to a redemption
which was preceded or followed by a tax-free stock dividend.
In the early decisions under the 1939 Code the courts readily
accepted the realities of "dividend equivalency" when stockholders of a closely held corporation effected a pro-rata redemption of their stock and thus stood in exactly the same
position after the redemption in terms of their interests in the
corporation. 1 3 In 1949, however, § 115(g) was held to be
limited to the situation where a corporation acquired its own
stock although, through the use of parent and subsidiary corporations, the acquisition of the stock of the parent by the
In
subsidiary was "essentially equivalent to a dividend."
Trustees of John Wanamaker v. Commissioner,,4 stock of the
parent corporation (John Wanamaker of Philadelphia) was
sold to two wholly owned subsidiaries (John Wanamaker of
New York and A. T. Stewart Realty Co.) with the net result
that the trustee taxpayers acquired accumulated earnings and
profits of the subsidiary corporations without any relinquish12 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201 (d), 42 Stat. 277.

1: See Goldstein v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1940); Smith v.
U. S., 34 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. Del. 1941), aff'd 121 F.2d 692 (3rd Cir.
(redemption of sole stockholders preferred stock which was
1941)
previously issued in part as a stock dividend); E. M. Peet et al, 43
B.T.A. 852 (1941).
14 11 T.C. 365, aff'd 178 F.2d 10 (3rd Cir. 1949).
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ment of their control over the two subsidiaries. The Commissioner argued that the "dividend equivalency" test was met
and that § 115 (g) was designed to insure dividend consequences
on the facts presented. The taxpayer relied on the Third
Circuit's decision in Mead Corporation v. Commissioner's to
support his argument that the language of § 115(g) was
specifically limited to a corporation's acquisition of "its"
stock and thus to preclude its application of the "dividend
equivalency" formula where a subsidiary acquired the stock of
its parent. The Tax Court held for the taxpayer and issued the
familiar judicial invitation for legislative amendment of the
statute if the result was contrary to the general pattern of the
taxation of redemption proceeds.
The Congress, again, moved quickly to plug the gap opened
by the Wanamaker decision and in the Revenue Act of 1950
set out to revise § 115(g) accordingly. The House Ways and
Means Committee16 apparently saw two tax avoidance possibilities as a result of the Wanamaker case. Since in Wanamaker there was a parent corporation and two subsidiaries, the
Ways and Means Committee was concerned not only with
what the taxpayer actually did in that case (viz., selling the
stock of the parent to one of the subsidiaries), but what might
have been achieved had the stock of one of the subsidiaries
been sold to the other. The House Committee felt that neither
of these plans should escape ordinary income treatment,
assuming the net effect was "essentially equivalent to a
dividend." Therefore, the House version of the bill was
broken down into two parts, one establishing the test of
dividend equivalency when the stock of the parent was sold to a
subsidiary and the other applying the same test when stock of a
corporation was sold to another "related" corporation." For
purposes of the second part of the House version of the bill,
"related corporations" was defined to include corporations
controlled by the same interests other than parent-subsidiary
corporations. Significantly, it is believed, the House Committee did not attempt to differentiate between the two situa15 116 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1940), -rv'g38 B.T.A. 687.

16 See H. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950-2 C.B. 420, 444.
17 The text of the Ways and Means Committee proposals may be found in
SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND
EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAWS, Vol. I (1954) 1724.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

3:451

tions when they described what they considered the realities
of the transactions to be. In both situations, the House bill
provided that for purposes of applying the "dividend equivalency" tests, and, incidentally, the determination of which
corporation's earning and profits were to be considered in
order to measure dividend consequences, the transactions were
to be viewed as if the corporation which initially issued the
stock had subsequently redeemed it. In the case of the redemption of the parent's stock by a subsidiary, the House
suggested that the "realities" of the transaction required that
the redemption be viewed as if the subsidiary had distributed
assets to the parent, and the parent had used these assets to
acquire its own stock. In the case of other "related" corporations the House viewed the redemption as "if such amount had
been distributed by the issuing corporation in redemption of
the stock and the stock thereafter had been sold by it to the
acquiring corporation."
The Senate accepted the House
plan in so far as it reached the situation where the taxpayer
sold the stock of a parent corporation to its subsidiary, but
refused to endorse the other situation which the House bill
covered. In rejecting the portion of the House bill dealing
with corporations related by common ownership, the Senate
in the Committee Reports isstated only that it was not clear
that redemptionby related corporations should involve dividend
consequences to the common owner. Although the Committee
reports do not state the basis for the Senate Finance Committee's decision, the failure of the House to differentiate between the parent-subsidiary redemption and redemption by
related corporations with regard to which corporation earnings
and profits were involved for purposes of measuring dividend
consequences, was no doubt an important factor. It is difficult
to justify imposing dividend consequences on a taxpayer when,
for instance, the corporation which purchases stock from the
taxpayer has no earnings and profits available for dividends
and has no readily available channel to acquire assets from
another "related corporation" except through the taxpayer
himself or through purchase of assets from the other corporations. This problem of supplying the appropriate "ficdon" in order to justify ordinary income treatment when one
related corporation acquired the stock of another plus the fact
18 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950-2 C.B. 514, 541.
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that the Wanamaker case did not pass on the tax consequences
of such a redemption, probably explains the Senate's hesitancy
to accept the House's version of the bill. In Conference, the
House receded in the Senate's version of the bill, and the
Congress did not further consider the matter until the 1954
Code was enacted.
In the period of time between the action of Congress on
the 1950 Revenue Act and the enactment of the 1954 Code, two
developments occurred which supported the Ways and Means
Committee's position in regard to the advisability of expanding
§ 115(g) to include redemptions by related corporations. In
1953, the Tax Court decided that § 115(g) (prior to the 1950
amendment of that section) did not reach redemptions by
related corporations' 9 and thus served notice on the Congress
that any hopes which the Senate Finance Committee might
have had in 1950 regarding a possible judicial solution of the
problem, independent of statutory specificity, was misplaced.
Secondly, the American Law Institute's proposed income tax
statute released shortly before the Congress acted on the 1954
Code endorsed the general theory of the House Ways and Means
Committee on redemptions by related corporations. 20 The
American Law Institute draft statute, however, did not solve
the problem which concerned the Senate in 1950-regarding
the treatment of earnings and profits of the related corporation
and a consistent theoretical justification for imposing ordinary
income treatment in such a case. Moreover, the American Law
Institute plan was limited to apply to redemptions by related
corporations only when one stockholder was in control of both
the acquiring and issuing corporation.
When the Congress considered the matter of redemption
of stock by related corporations in preparation for the 1954
revision, it was decided that the new 1954 Code section should
attempt to meet the problem of "brother-sister" redemptions
and § 304(a)(1) entitled "Acquisition by related corporations
(other than subsidiary)" was the product. A detailed examination of § 304 will be the concern of the final section of this
19 Emma Cramer, 20 T.C. 679 (1953).
2

0 Sec. X532, A.L.I. Federal Income Tax Statate, Feb. 1954, Draft, Vol. II,

30-31, 273-274.
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paper, but before leaving the legislative history preceding the
enactment of § 304 it seems appropriate to discuss the post1954 interpretations of § 115(g) in order to complete the picture
under the 1939 Code.
The Internal Revenue Service issued the first revenue ruling
pertaining to "brother-sister" redemptions in 1955.21 In
Ruling 55-15 the Service took the position, contrary to the
Cramer case, that a sale made by a sole shareholder of all his
stock in one corporation to another corporation wholly owned
by him in order to eliminate the administrative expense and
to simplify the dual operation was devoid of "economic
reality" insofar as any relinquishment of the interest in the first
corporation was concerned. The Service therefore ruled that
payments received from such sale represented cash distributions
to the taxpayer taxable as dividends under § 115(a)22 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939. It is to be noted that the
Service did not rely on § 115(g) in issuing the ruling. The
theory implicit in the Commissioner's position was that a sale
of stock of one corporation to another could not constitute a
"redemption or cancellation" within the meaning of § 115(g)
of the 1939 Code regardless of the fact of common control
and, therefore, the only issue presented was whether the transaction constituted a "sale" or a corporate "distribution" within
the meaning of § 115(a) of the 1939 Code. Further, since the
purported "sale" did not alter the status of the shareholder as
sole owner of the two corporations, the relinquishment of any
paper shares was without substance and should be disregarded
in determining tax consequences. The Service did not refer to
1950 amendments which added 115(g)(2) nor to the fact that
the Senate Finance Committee had expressly rejected a statutory
amendment which would specifically cover the facts presented
by the ruling. Since Cramerwas the only outstanding authority
against the Commissioner at the time of the ruling, his decision
was apparently based on the hope that the courts would
eventually accept the proposition that no specific statutory
language was necessary in the brother-sister cases while
115(g)(2) dealing with parent-subsidiary redemptions, was
21

Rev. Rul. 55-15, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 361.
115(a) of the 1939 Code contained the basic definition of a
dividend comparable to the function of § 301 and § 316 of the 1954 Code.

22Section
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necessary due to the Wanamaker decision. His position was
not to be sustained, however.
In 1957 two cases 23 which originated in the Tax Court
were decided against the Commissioner's position in Revenue
Ruling 55-15. In both cases the courts took the position that
the legislative history of § 115(g)(2) was controlling. In the
absence of special statutory treatment as was the case for parentsubsidiary redemptions under 115(g)(2), the Court held that
the two different legal entities (although related by common
ownership) were to be respected for tax purposes.
In the face of the First Circuit's affirmance in Westerhaus
and Pope and the Tax Court's earlier decision in Cramer, the
Commissioner conceded the issue in Revenue Ruling 59-97.2 4

Of course, the Commissioner was guarded by § 304(a)(1) for
cases arising after the enactment of the 1954 Code. Also, in
Ruling 59-97 one note of warning was added after Westerhaus,
Pope and Cramer were approved:
...

However, capital gain treatment will continue to be

denied in cases where and to the extent that, the stock is
sold at a price in excess of its fair market value, and in
cases where there exist other factors indicating that the
true import of the transaction is the receipt of ordinary
income, by way of dividend or otherwise, rather than sale
of stock. See, Gold T.C. Memo 58-2 and Tiddon 22 T.C.
1220 rev. and rem. on other grounds, 230 F.2d 304, cert.
den., 352 U.S. 824.
This caution hardly seems necessary since there is nothing in
the Gold and Tiddon cases cited by the Commissioner which
suggests that the brother-sister relationship between the corporations involved there controlled the result. That is to say,
there simply was not an arm's length sale of stock in these
cases, and the principle of a "constructive dividend" has always
been available to the Commissioner under such circumstances
whether brother-sister corporations are involved or not.2 5
Westerhaus Co. et al, T.C. Memo 1957-213 (1957); Commissioner v.
Pope, 1956-41 (1956), af'd 239 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1957).
24 Rev. Rul. 59-97, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 684.
25 Compare the argument of the taxpayer in U. S. v. Collins, 193 F. Supp.
2

602, rev'd -,

F.2d -

(1st Cir. 1962), 9 A.F.T.R.2d 1113.
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A. The General Scope of § 304 Under the 1954 Code
Section 304 of the 1954 Code is designed to continue the
rules of § 115(g)(2) of the 1939 Code relating to parent-subsidiary redemptions and, in addition, to provide new statutory
rules for brother-sister redemptions. Section 304 does not
state that all redemptions of stock by related corporations will
result in dividend treatment to the redeeming shareholder.
In order to determine whether dividend consequences will
result, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of § 302 which
specifically describe those situations in which redemptions are
not equivalent to dividends. 2 6 Also, § 304 is dependent upon
§ 303 dealing with distributions in redemption of stock to pay
death taxes. Therefore, the real function of § 304 is to provide
positive statutory authority for the recasting of stockholders'
dealings with two or more separate legal entities in order to
insure that tax consequences are a matter of substance and not
merely form. Once the facts are recast according to the economic
realities of the transaction, the rules of § 302 and § 303 should
be applied to determine proper tax results.
Section 304(a)(1) provides the 1954 Code rules in the case
of brother-sister redemptions. Entitled "Acquisition by related
corporation (other than subsidiary)" this subsection defines
the required relationship strictly on the basis of common control by one or more persons of each of two corporations.
Section 304(a)(1) states, by way of parenthetical reference to
the parent-subsidiary rules of § 304(a)(2), that in the event of
overlap between the provisions of § 304(a)(1) and § 304(a)(2)
that the rules of § 304(a)(2) shall govern. Assuming then that
the definitional requirements of § 304(a)(1) are met, if one of
the corporations under common control acquires stock of the
other corporation in return for property from the person (or
persons) so in control, such property shall be treated as a distribution in redemption of the stock of the corporation acquir2"

Section 302(b) specifies the following types of redemptions as qualifying
for "exchange" treatment: § 302(b)(1)-redemptions not equivalent
to dividends; § 302(b)(2)-substantially disproportionate redemption
of stock; § 302(b)(3)-termination of shareholder's interest; § 302
(b) (4)--stock issued by railroad corporations in certain reorganizations. Section 302(a) actually is the operative section with respect to
the definitions supplied by § 302(b). Section 302(a) declares any redemption described in § 302(b) "shall be treated as a distribution in
part or full payment in exchange for the stock."
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ing such stock. 27 Also, § 304(a)(1) describes the effects which
the "redemption treatment" shall have upon the stock in the
hands in the acquiring corporation. The statute provides that
the stock shall be treated as a contribution to capital of the
acquiring corporation.
Section 304(a)(2) treats the case of a parent-subsidiary
redemption by simply stating that if the issuing corporation
controls the acquiring corporation, the acquisition of the
parent's stock by the subsidiary from a shareholder of the
parent shall be treated as a distribution in redemption of the
stock of theparentcorporation.
Section 304(b) which is applicable to both parent-subsidiary
and brother-sister redemptions provides that for purposes of
testing the transaction under § 302(b) the reference should be
to the situation of the issuing corporation's stock before and
after the redemption. Also, § 304(b) states that in applying
§ 318(a) (relating to constructive ownership of stock) with
respect to § 302(b) for purposes of this subsection, § 318(a)
(2)(C) shall be applied without regard to the fifty percent
limitation contained therein.
Section 304(c) describes the earning and profits rules which
shall be applicable for purposes of determining the extent to
which a distribution (resulting from an application of § 302(d)
and § 301 by virtue of the operation of § 304 shall constitute a
dividend. In the case of a brother-sister redemption, the determination is to be made solely by reference to the earnings and
profits of the acquiring corporation. However, in the case of
the parent-subsidiary redemption the determination shall be
made as if the property were distributed by the acquiring corporation to the issuing corporation and immediately thereafter
distributed by the issuing corporation. The latter rule is the
same rule which prevailed under § 115(g)(2) of the 1939 Code
as noted previously.
Section 304(c) defines "control" for purposes of this
section. Since the material immediately following will discuss
27

For purposes of applying the tests of § 302(b), however, it is the stockholder's position with respect to the issuing corporation which is controlling. See the text discussion of § 304(b).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

3:451

these provisions in some detail, the Code provisions will not
be paraphrased here.
B. The Specific Requirements of § 304 and Problem Areas
1. Control.
Section 304(c) defines "control" consistently in the brothersister and parent-subsidiary situations. In both § 304(a)(1)
and § 304 (a)(2) "control" is defined as the ownership of
stock possessing at least fifty percent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or at least
fifty percent of the total value of all classes of stock. In the
case of the parent-subsidiary relationship, of course, the
"control" definition applies to the parent's ownership of the
subsidiary's stock while in the brother-sister situation the
"control" test must be applied to each of the two corporations
under common ownership for purposes of determining the
applicability of § 304. It should also be noted that the control
definition applies where a person (or persons) is in "control"
(per the 50 per cent test just given) of a corporation which in
turn controls (applying the same test) another corporation,
then the persons controlling the parent are also considered to
control the subsidiary. 28 Therefore, it is possible to have
§ 304 applying to a redemption between corporations collaterally related at the "second generation" level.
Perhaps the most important single feature of the control
test is the application of the constructive ownership rules of
§ 318 without the 50% limitation described in § 318(a)(2)(C).
This feature of the statute has been the subject of considerable
comment 2 0 and is primarily responsible for the most serious
technical defect in the law. Due to the operation of the attribution rules of § 318 without the fifty percent limitation, a
strict application of those rules would result in every brothersister pair of corporations being subject to the parent-subsidiary
28

A recent example of the application of this rule may be found in Radnitz v.
U. S.,187 F. Supp. 952, aff'd 294 F.2d 577 (2nd Cir. 1961).

20 See for example, the discussions in Lanahan, Redemptions Through Use of

Related Corporations, 18 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 741, 744
(1960) and Diamond, "Brother-Sister Corporations"-Sale of Stock or
Other Assets and Other Problems, 1959 SO. CALIF. TAX INST. 109, 118.
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treatment. An example will best describe this strange situation: 3 0
Assume that A, B, C and D each own 25% of the outstanding stock of Corporation X and Y. If Corporation Y purchases
two shares of Corporation X's stock from A (assuming X and
Y each have 100 shares of stock outstanding), § 304(a)(1) has
no application to the transaction. This is because applying
the attribution rules of § 318 (disregarding the 50% limitation
of § 318(a)(2)(C)) A owns 25% of the stock of X Corporation
directly, and since Corporation Y is deemed to own the shares
of X held by B, C and D, A constructively owns 25% of the
shares of X which Corporation Y is deemed to own. Therefore
since A only owns a total of approximately 44% of Corporation
X's stock (25% directly plus 25% of 75% or 19% constructively)
he is not in "control" of Corporation X within the meaning
of § 304(a)(1). But, applying the same constructive ownership
rules, it is also a correct application of the statute to attribute
all the stock of Corporation X's shareholders to Corporation X.
Therefore, Corporation X is in control of 100% of the stock of
Corporation Y before A transfers his two shares of Corporation
X to Corporation Y. Now, since Corporation Y is controlled
by Corporation X, a parent-subsidiary relationship exists between X and Y and § 304(a)(2) would seem to be applicable.
The effect of the latter interpretation would be to eliminate
the brother-sister rules entirely-certainly a result completely
at odds with Congress's purpose in enacting § 304. It is interesting to note that it will be to Commissioner's advantage in
practically all cases if the parent-subsidiary rules are applied
rather than the brother-sister rules. Since a parent-subsidiary
redemption will result in dividend income when either the
parent or subsidiary has earnings and profits under § 304(b)
(2)(B), while in brother-sister cases under § 304(b) (2) (A) only
the earnings and profits of the acquiring corporation are taken
into consideration, a parent-subsidiary redemption is more
likely to create dividend income rather than return of capital.
Aside from the peculiar results which are described above,
there is a highly unrealistic flavor to the attribution rules of
§ 318 when the 50% limitation is ignored. Assume individual
30

This example is suggested by Lanahan, id. at 753.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 3:451

A owns one share American Telephone and Telegraph and
also is in control of a closely held family corporation, By virtue
of § 318 minus the 50% limitation, American Telephone and
Telegraph is constructively in control of A's family corporation.
One further result of the § 318 rules bears attention. In
the brother-sister redemption situation it would seem to be
impossible for a common shareholder to achieve a complete
termination of his interest in the issuing corporation within
the meaning of § 302(b)(3) unless he completely divested
himself of his shares in both the acquiring as well as the issuing
corporation. 31 Since he would be the constructive owner of
shares held by the acquiring corporation to the extent of his
proportional interest in the acquiring corporation, he would not
seem to meet the requirements of § 302(b)(3) even if he disposed of all his shares in the issuing corporation to the acquiring corporation. On the other hand, there seems to be no
logical reason why a shareholder who is subject to the rules of
§ 304(a)(1) only because a member of his family owns a controlling interest in another corporation (assuming no other
relationship exists between the two corporations) could not
sell the shares of his own controlled corporation to the other
corporation controlled by a relative and rely on the "waiver
of family attribution rules" of § 302(c)(2). If so, a § 302(b)(3)
"complete termination" would seem to be possible in this
rather limited situation.32 In 1959, the Subchapter C Advisory
Group recommended to the Congress that the control definition in § 304(c) be amended by substituting a 5% limitation in
lieu of the 50% limitation now in § 318(a)(2)(C). The Advisory
Group does not dearly state in its report submitted to Congress
the reasons for the suggested change. However, it is dear that
the recommendation basically endorses the approach of the
1954 Code with the 5% limitation added merely to eliminate
the de minimis cases. In this regard, the Advisory Group
also recommended an amendment to the basic attribution
section itself, § 318, and a 5% rule was recommended in lieu
31 In case of a parent-subsidiary redemption, a § 302(b) (3) would be pos32

sible. See Regs. 1.304-3 (b), Example.
Section 304, by its terms, is not restricted to 302 (b) considerations alone.
Both sections 304(a) (1) and 304(a) (2) are introduced by the phrase
"For purposes of sections 302 and 303

. .

.". There is, therefore, no

apparent reason why § 302(c) (2) should not apply.
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of the present 50% rule in that section, as well.3 3 The explanation
which is offered for the basic § 318 proposed amendment would
seem equally applicable to the § 304 recommendation:
It is recommended, however, that a 5 percent limitation
be inserted in all cases. This will eliminate de minimis computations so that persons having small interests in corporations, partnerships, trusts, and estates can ignore the attribution computations.34
The Advisory Group also recommended a definite statement in § 304 to eliminate the possibility, discussed above,
that all brother-sister corporations might be regarded as
parent-subsidiary groups by virtue of the attribution rules.35
Since the Advisory Group did not recommend a fundamental
departure from the present -rules of attribution, such a statement would be necessary to eliminate the problem.
2. Earnings and Profits.
In the case of parent-subsidiary redemptions, if either the
issuing parent or the acquiring subsidiary has accumulated
current earnings and profits, the effect of the fictional distribution by the acquiring subsidiary to the issuing parent
followed by a "deemed" redemption by the parent of its own
stock, will produce a dividend to the shareholder. In the case
of brother-sister redemptions, the accumulated and current
earnings and profits of the issuing corporation are disregarded.
The Subchapter C Advisory Group has taken the position that
this situation opens the door to tax avoidance in the case of
brother-sister redemptions. The Advisory Group illustrates
the point by the use of the following example:
33 Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representa.
tives, on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K
of the Internal Revenue Code, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 491 (1959).
34 Id. at 504.
35 The Advisory Group suggests the following sentence in their proposed

section: "In the case of a transaction which subsection (a) (1) of this
section applies and to which subsection (a) (2) also applies by reason
of the application of section 318(a), the determination of whether the
distribution shall be treated as in part or full payment in exchange for
the stock redeemed shall be made only under the rules of subsection
(a) (1)." Id. at 577, 578.
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Assume, for example, that individual A owning all
the stock of the X Corporation creates the Y Corporation.
Y corporation then borrows money from outside sources to
purchase all the stock of the X Corporation from individual
A. If the X Corporation is then liquidated into the Y Corporation and its assets used to pay off the loan, such a
transaction may be generally described as a reorganization
accompanied by a distribution of boot. However, if the X
Corporation is not liquidated but merely pays out dividends
to the Y Corporation to satisfy the loan payments, the
transaction would appear to be beyond the scope of the
literal language of § 304.3 6
Under the proposed amendment of the Advisory Group, the
determination of the amount which is a dividend would be
made as if the property were distributed by the issuing corporation to the acquiring corporation and immediately thereafter distributed by the acquiring corporation. 37 The result of
the proposal would be to insure dividend consequences if
earnings and profits were present in either the acquiring or the
issuing corporations in brother-sister cases.
It has been suggested that the distinction drawn in the 1954
Code between the "fictional" distribution in parent and subsidiary redemptions and the absence of such a fictional approach in brother-sister redemptions is due to the fact that only
in the parent-subsidiary case could such a hypothetical intercorporate distribution occur, because only in that case are
there intercorporate stockholdings. 38 It will be recalled that
this is the same theoretical argument which probably influenced
the Senate Finance Committee when it rejected provisions in
the House version of the 1950 Revenue Act covering brothersister redemptions.
3. Basis Considerations
Section 304(a)(1) and the regulations thereunder prescribe 3 o in some detail the basis adjustments which must be
Id. at 491.
37 Ibid.
36

3s

BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS (1959) 236.

39 Regs. 1.304-2 (a).
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made as a result of a brother-sister redemption. These rules
may be summarized as follows:
(a) The transferee (acquiring) corporation shall treat
the stock acquired as a contribution to its capital. Therefore
the rules of § 362(a)40 apply in order to determine the
basis of the stock in the hands of the transferor. This rule
applies whether the distribution by the corporation results
in dividend consequences to the shareholder under § 302(d)
or whether § 302(a) applies.
(b) The transferor shareholder, on the other hand,
must make different basis adjustments to his stock in the
transferee (acquiring) corporation depending upon whether
the distribution by the transferee (acquiring) corporation
falls under § 302(d) (with dividend consequences to the
shareholder) or § 302(a).
(1) If § 302(d) applies to the surrender of stock by the
shareholder, his basis for his stock in the acquiring corporation
shall not be reduced except according to the rules of § 301.
Therefore, to the extent the acquiring corporation has accumulated earnings and profits the shareholder will realize dividend
income to the extent of the cash or fair market value of the
property received4l and there will be no basis adjustment
necessary under § 301. If the acquiring corporation does not
have earnings and profits available for dividends, the result
will be a pro-tanto reduction in the basis of the stock of the
acquiring corporation retained by the shareholder as required by

§ 301(a).
(2) If § 302(d) does not apply, the property received shall
be treated as received in a distribution in payment in exchange
for stock of the acquiring corporation under § 302(a), which
40Section 362 provides that if property is acquired by a corporation as a
contribution to capital "then the basis shall be the same as it would

be in the hands of the transferor, increased in the amount of gain recog-

nized to the transferor on such transfer."

43 Assuming in the case of the property distribution that the distributee is

an individual. If the distributee is a corporation, § 301(b) (1) (B)
applies which provides that the "amount" of a distribution to such a
distributee is the property's fair market value (determined as of the
time of distribution) or its adjusted basis in the hands of the distributing
corporation, whichever is the lesser.
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stock has a basis equal to the amountbywhich the stockholder's
basis for his stock in the acquiring corporation was increased
on account of the contribution to capital. Accordingly, the
basis of the shareholder's stock in the acquiring corporation
shall now be reduced by the amount which is deemed to be
received in exchange for the "contribution to capital".
Of course, the net effect of the above upward and downward
adjustments is to leave the basis of the stock of the acquiring
corporation in the hands of the shareholder unchanged and
achieve the same result as if the stock of the issuing corporation were considered to be "sold" to the acquiring corporation
in an ordinary sale transaction. The reason for these verbal
gymnastics is that the Congressional language in the last
sentence of § 304(a)(1) requires that the transfer of stock be
treated as a "contribution to capital" of the acquiring corporation without differentiating between transfers subject to 302(a)
or 302(d). The Commissioner, therefore, is required to give
effect to the language of the statute even though the "contribution to capital" theory simply does not fit the situation when
§ 302(a) applies. When the Commissioner first issued his
regulation under § 304, he took the position that there was no
distinction between a § 302(a) and § 302(d) distribution for
basis purposes. 4 2 However, in a 1958 ruling 4 3 when the facts
presented demonstrated the illogical result which obtains when
a distribution subject to § 302(a) does not result in a "cost"
basis to the shareholder as would be the case in an ordinary
sale, the Commissioner retreated from his original position
taken in the regulations. Accordingly, the regulations were
amended44 and the method of an upward basis adjustment
of the shareholders' stock in the acquiring corporation (to
comply with statutory mandate that the "contribution to
capital" rules shall apply) followed by an equal downward
adjustment (to achieve ordinary "sale" results) was utilized.
This is certainly a fascinating example of administrative
ingenuity designed to "cover up" for a legislative oversight.
42

Regs. 1.304-2 (c) Ex. 2, T.D. 6152 (1955)

48

Rev. Rul. 58-79, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 177.
Regs. 1.304-2 (a) and 1.304-2(c) Ex. 2, T.D. 6533 (1961).

44

(amended by T.D. 6533, 1961).
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The Advisory Group on Subchapter C recommended in its
1959 report that the statute itself be amended to state clearly
the rules which the Commissioner is presently applying by
virtue of the amended regulations. 45 As the Advisory Group
points out, the amendment of the law is desirable because for
purposes of other sections of the Code, it may be of considerable importance to the acquiring corporation whether the
basis of the stock acquired is "cost" or -determined by reference
to the basis in the transferor's hands."
The problem of the basis of the properties exchange in the
brother-sister redemption situation discussed above is not
present in the parent-subsidiary case. The statute does not
specify rules in the parent-subsidiary case and, therefore, the
basis rules will follow the distinction between a § 302(a) and a
§ 302 (d) redemption. Hence, if a § 302(a) exchange is made
by a stockholder of the parent and the subsidiary, the basis of
the parent's stock in the hands of the subsidiary and the basis
of any property received by the shareholder of the parent will
be determined under § 1012 (cost). Conversely, if a § 302(d)
distribution is involved, the entire amount of the distribution
by the subsidiary will be treated as dividend income (assuming
sufficient earnings and profits in the parent or subsidiary)
and the stockholder of the parent will increase the basis of his
retained stock in the parent by his basis for the stock of the
parent which he has relinquished in the exchange. To complete
the picture, the basis of the parent's stock in the hands of the
subsidiary should be a carryover basis from the stockholder
who transferred the stock. 4 8
4. Judicial decisions interpreting § 304
Unfortunately, the cases which have arisen under the 1954
Code to this point have not presented any important questions
under § 304. Two cases dealing with brother-sister redemptions
are noteworthy, however, primarily because the taxpayer's
argument completely misinterprets the function of § 304 and
the courts have reached the correct result by reasoning in
accord with the purpose of the statute.
45

48

Hearing Before the Committee on Ways and Means, op. cit. supra note
33, at 491, 492.
See Regs. 1.304-3 (b), Example.
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The taxpayer's principal argument in the cases of Radnitz
U. S. 47 and U. S. v. Collins48 may be summarized by the
following extract from the First Circuit's opinion in the Collins
case, where the First Circuit refers to the decision below in the
District Court: 4 9
V.

In its enumeration of the countervailing considerations
to dividend equivalence the district court, after noting the
initial necessity of a corporation having earnings or profits
available for distribution before Section 302 would be
applicable, stated: 'but it is also essential that these earnings
or profits should have been distributed, and thus that there
should have been an actual reduction of the corporation
surplus.' In concluding that the transaction had produced
no reduction in surplus so far as the Collins Company [the
acquiring corporation] was concerned, the court stated:
'The corporation received stock of Perman [the issuing
corporation] which was actually worth the $15,000 paid
for it. It paid out $15,000 in cash but received assets worth
at least $15,000. Conversely the individual shareholders
received the cash but parted with property of equal value.
Hence there was no real distribution to them of any of the
earned surplus of the corporation and hence no dividend.'
The First Circuit quite properly disposed of this argument
by pointing out that the court's emphasis below on the quid
pro quo of the transaction was entirely misplaced. The
economic consequences to the taxpayer are no different, the
First Circuit said, than if the acquiring corporation had distributed property to him without requiring the surrender of
stock, except for the fact (usually devoid of practical consequences) that the acquiring corporation now holds the stock
of the issuing corporation. Perhaps the most surprising thing
about these two cases is that the District Court in Collins accepted the taxpayer's argument!
C. An Appraisal of § 304
Although § 304, on its face, appears to be one of the least
complex provisions in Subchapter C, this simplicity is mis47 Op.

cit. supra, note 38.

48 Op. cit. supra, note 25.

49 Id. at 9 A.F.T.R. 2d 1119.
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leading. It is not at all clear that the Congress, the Revenue
Service, tax practitioners in general nor the Subchapter C
Advisory Group have developed a satisfactory theoretical
basis for dividend consequences in brother-sister redemption
cases. Ever since the Senate Finance Committee took the position in 1950 that it was not dear that brother-sister redemptions
were the equivalent of dividends, there seems to have been a
cautious approach to the mechanics of the statute. It is submitted that this cautious attitude is the result of the absence of
any consistent, dear-out theory on what are "the economic
realities" of brother-sister redemptions. The fact that the
statute as drafted in 1954 contained at least two technical flaws,
since brought to light, indicates that § 304 was not the most
carefully thought out provision in the 1954 Code. It is not
conceivable that Congress intended the statute to be susceptible
of a construction which would convert every brother-sister
redemption case into a parent-subsidiary redemption case and
yet, as previously discussed, the statute may be so construed.
Also, with regard to the basis for the stock of the issuing corporation in the hands of the acquiring corporation, the drafters
of § 304 in requiring the stock to be treated as a "contribution
to capital" neglected the possibility that §302(a) and not § 302
(d) might be applicable.
The Subchapter C Advisory Group recommends the
amendment of the statute in certain respects including a recommendation that dividend consequences are to be determined in
the case of brother-sister redemptions, by reference to a fictional distribution from the issuing corporation to the acquiring
corporation and an assumed distribution by the acquiring
corporation to the shareholder. The avowed purpose of this
recommendation is to eliminate one possible method of
avoiding the present provisions of § 304 00 and is justified according to the Advisory Group for the purposes of general
application, because "the acquiring corporation will become a
substantial stockholder of the issuing corporation-if not its
actual parent corporation." On the other hand, the Advisory
Group recommends that a positive statement be placed in
§ 304 which will serve to preserve the brother-sister relationship from possible conversion into parent-subsidiary corpora50 See the example given by the Advisory Group in its report to illustrate

this tax avoidance possibility, supra.
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tion by virtue of the application of the constructive ownership
rules of § 318. Why is it so necessary to insure that the constructive ownership rules do not destroy the separate treatment
of brother-sister redemption and parent-subsidiary redemptions
when the most important distinction between the treatment of
the two situations is to be obliterated? 51 Moreover, if the
application of the constructive ownership rules of § 318(a) do
result in every brother-sister pattern being converted into
parent and subsidiary without the special statement recommended by the Advisory Group, does a statement negating
the normal operation of those rules really meet the heart of
the problem? If the economic justification for treating the
redemption of stock of the issuing corporation by the acquiring
corporation where both corporations are under common control is to prevent the legal distinction of two separate corporate
entities from controlling tax consequences, it is submitted that
the controlling theory should be that the two corporations are
one and the same. This means that the Advisory Group approach in recommending no essential difference between the
earnings and profits rules in the brother-sister and parentsubsidiary cases is consistent with the basic justification for
the statute. Since the parent-subsidiary rules of § 304(a) (2) are
based upon exactly the same justification, it is not dangerous
nor even surprising that the constructive ownership rules of
§ 318(a) might convert brother-sister corporations into parent
and subsidiary. In other words, why take pains to identify
two types of redemptions by related corporations when, in
fact, the results of the two sets of rules are exactly the same?
If one single definition of "related corporations" could be
devised which would embrace both types of "controlled corporations" now treated separately in §§ 304(a)(1) and 304(a)(2),
the statute would be simplified and the definition of "control",
the proper earnings and profits considerations and the basis
provisions, could be stated in short order. The result should be
conducive to the development of rules which are consistent
with the basic theory underlying redemptions by related corporations-the theory that the existence of two or more corporations "as legal entities should be disregarded for tax purposes in the case of redemptions by related corporations."
51 The distinction referred to in the text are the varying rules for determining

earnings and profits for dividend purposes under § 304(a) (1)
§ 304 (a) (2), discussed previously.
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